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Abstract
This Book Review surveys The Post-Cold War Trading System by Sylvia Ostry. Part I explains
the features of international trade law and policy the book highlights, and the perspectives offered
by the book about those features. Part II of this review critically analyzes the book. It identifies the
issues not addressed, and the arguments not made. Part II thereby imparts to the prospective reader
a sense of what must be learned from other sources on international trade law and policy. Part III
offers a brief concluding observation about the future direction of international trade scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not easy to assess the modern era of international trade
law and policy in one slender volume. An author must explain
the geopolitical and economic context in which the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was born in 1947,
develop a view as to the nature, evolution, and purpose of the
GATT system, and provide a road map of the legal intricacies
associated with prominent features of the system-like antidump-
ing law and seemingly arcane features like textile quotas. Sylvia
Ostry, the Director of the Center for International Studies at the
University of Toronto and the former Canadian Ambassador to
the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, does an admirable job of
discussing the modern era in The Post-Cold War Trading System.1
In 239 pages plus a sixteen-page appendix, Professor Ostry
brings us from the ashes of World War II and the destroyed Eu-
ropean and Japanese economies to the December 1996 World
Trade Organization ("WTO") Ministerial Meeting in Singapore.
The seven chapters of The Post-Cold War Trading System cover
post-War European and Japanese economic development, the
birth and growth of GATT, the East Asian miracle, the multilat-
eral commitments made in the Uruguay Round, and the steps
needed to strengthen international trade law and policy. To em-
bark on, much less succeed, in a project of such grand scope but
confine the final product to less than three hundred pages is
venerable. Thus, The Post-Cold War Trading System is excellent
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reading for the current or budding international trade lawyer
seeking an overview of "where we were," "how we got to be where
we are," and "where we might be going."
At the same time, the book suffers from a small number of
noteworthy shortcomings, which perhaps is inevitable given the
disconnect between its scope and size, that some readers may
find frustrating. These shortcomings may be characterized
broadly by saying that some readers may find the book has a bit
of a desultory quality. However, this point ought not to detract
from the ambitious nature and successes of Ostry's project.
Every day, international trade touches the lives of virtually every
American in ways most Americans take for granted. We wake up
to watch the morning news on a Sony television set made in East
or Southeast Asia and to go jogging in shoes made by a Nike
factory located in the Guangdong. While watching our TV, or
upon our return from our jog, we drink coffee from beans har-
vested in Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, or
Kenya. When we dress for work, we put on apparel made in
China, South or Southeast Asia, and we splash on French or Ital-
ian cologne or perfume. We go to work in a car quite possibly
made by Honda or Toyota - or better yet, Mercedes or BMW -
and almost certainly running on Middle Eastern oil. At work, we
use telecommunications and computer equipment made by a
multinational corporation at an overseas production facility. On
a good day, after work, we enjoy an ethnic restaurant meal with
French, Italian, or German wine. Only in our entertainment af-
ter work - be it through television programming, movies, music,
books, or magazines - are we likely to insist on American prod-'
ucts. (Of course, the rest of the world has the same voracious
appetite for American cultural industry products as we do.) In
brief, trade is inevitable and ubiquitous, hence the importance
of Ostry's efforts to discuss the globalization process.
To give the prospective reader a sense of what she will en-
counter, Part I of this review surveys The Post-Cold War Trading
System. It explains the features of international trade law and
policy the book highlights, and the perspectives offered by the
book about those features. Part II of this review critically ana-
lyzes the book. It identifies the issues not addressed, and the
arguments not made. Part II thereby imparts to the prospective
reader a sense of what must be learned from other sources on
international trade law and policy. Part III offers a brief con-
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cluding observation about the future direction of international
trade scholarship.
I. THE MAJESTIC SCOPE OF The Post-Cold War Trading System
A. Unintended Results
The Post-Cold War Trading System observes that for Americans,
the development of the trading system since World War II has
had two unintended and unwelcome results. First, The United
States's early post-War economic policy, particularly the willing-
ness to transfer manufacturing technology, allowed the Euro-
pean and Japanese economies ravaged by the War to recover
and, by the 1970s, boast a standard of living comparable to that
in the United States. The catalyst for this policy was the U.S.
Cold War containment strategy. Accordingly, the Truman Ad-
ministration enthusiastically sponsored the Marshall Plan to help
re-build Europe, and both the Roosevelt and Truman Adminis-
trations strongly encouraged the development of the Bretton
Woods institutions for the benefit of the world economy.
Through foreign direct investment ("FDI") in Europe, technol-
ogy was transferred that enabled European companies to de-
velop their manufacturing prowess.2 While the Japanese market
was not too open to FDI, and U.S. firms lacked interest in this
market, these firms eagerly signed technology transfer license
agreements with Japanese companies, thereby enabling the lo-
cals to gain manufacturing expertise.' The unintended, unwel-
come result of American generosity was the convergence of the
European and Japanese economies with the U.S. economy by
the 197 0s.4 Indeed, by the Tokyo Round, multilateral trade ne-
gotiations no longer were dominated by the United States alone,
but rather by the three great economic powers. (To be sure, The
Post-Cold War Trading System may convey too much surprise at this
convergence. Given the over-riding need to contain Soviet and
Chinese communism, and given that "dispossessed" countries
with no vested interest in the international political economy
might be more likely to adopt radical development strategies
and means to achieve them, it may be asked with hindsight why
2. See id. at 6-13, 22-35 (1997).
3. See id. at 44-50.
4. See id. at xv-xvi, 55-56.
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the United States did not try to develop even more countries
into robust trading partners.)
The second developmental result neither intended nor wel-
comed by Americans was the emergence of forms of market
economies in Europe and Japan that differed from the U.S.
model. The European model was marked by greater state plan-
ning and ownership of productive resources, and copious wel-
fare benefits.5 The Japanese model featured a public-private
partnership, high concentration (e.g., the notorious keiretsu),
and lifetime job security for workers in major and mid-level
firms.6 In other words, neither European nor Japanese capital-
ism tracked the U.S. model in which (1) state intervention had
to be justified by market failure, (2) companies behaved in the
neoclassical economic manner as short-term profit maximizers
rather than long-term market-share maximizers, and (3) a social
safety net existed only for the truly dispossessed, not the able-
bodied.
B. System Friction
This diversity in economic systems would, by the 1970s,
force an expansion in the trade negotiating agenda. The United
States insisted that greater state intervention and industrial con-
5. See id. at 19-22, 83. To be sure, presently this model is not accepted throughout
Europe, as the contrasting policies of England's Prime Minister Tony Blair and France's
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin evince. See, e.g., Dominique Moisi, Right Man on Wrong
Path, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at 18 (observing that "[t]he idea that central government,
as opposed to market forces, can be held directly responsible for the creation of jobs"
is, while outdated elsewhere, "probably in tune with the feelings of most French people,
who want to be protected by the state from long working hours as well as from foreign
immigrants"); Warren Hoge, First Test for Britain's Camelot: Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1998, at 1 (discussing legislation enacted by Blair's New Labor government to cut
support for jobless single mothers, submit benefits of sick and disabled persons to
means test, and require young unemployed people to report to governmentjob centers
and seek employment or job training, or face elimination of their benefits).
6. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 35-44. One particularly interesting insight is that
immediately following World War II, the Truman Administration intended for Japan
only to be a peaceful, democratic, liberal Third World country, and not develop a stan-
dard of living higher than that of neighboring Asian countries. The Administration felt
Japan was to blame for its destruction and, therefore, the Allied powers should not take
on the burden of repairing the war damage. Correspondingly, the giant industrial com-
bines (zaibatsu), a centerpiece of Imperial Japan's war machine, were to be broken up.
However, as the Cold War began, industrial de-concentration was seen as socialistic, and
revenge againstJapan came to be viewed as contrary to U.S. political and business inter-
ests in the light of the need to contain communism. See id. at 35-40.
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centration reduced market-access opportunities for U.S. export-
ers and investors. The result, to borrow the catchy term from
The Post-Cold War Trading System, was greater "system friction,"7
because U.S. trade negotiators demanded reforms in areas previ-
ously viewed as the sovereign province of domestic governmental
policy. After all, the United States thought it was creating a bul-
wark against communism that was a replica of itself. When it
found out differently, Americans exclaimed "unfair!"'8 To the
chagrin of the United States, however, the Tokyo Round failed
to produce meaningful reductions in non-tariff barriers regard-
ing agricultural subsidies (e.g., the European Union ("EU")
made few changes in its Common Agricultural Policy) or safe-
guards (e.g., the EU insisted on the right to apply safeguard
measures selectively).' Moreover, the numerous codes agreed to
during that Round were plurilateral, not multilateral, agree-
ments that side-stepped the traditional one-country, one-vote
consensus operation and rules-based nature of the GATT system,
causing a fragmentation or "balkanization" of the system.' °
These codes raised a concern about free riders who might get
the benefit, but not incur the obligations, set forth in the codes.
To deal with this concern, conditional most-favored nation
("MFN") treatment-was introduced into the GATT system for the
first time: MFN treatment was accorded only to code signato-
ries.11 The solution, of course, undermined the hallowed un-
conditional MFN principle. Finally, no progress was made on
trade-impeding barriers entrenched in the Japanese economy,
and the U.S. trade deficit and investment asymmetries with Ja-
pan ballooned during the 1970s and 1980s.12
7. See, e.g., OSTRY, supra note 2, at xvii, 72, 98, 110-11, 124-26, 131-32, 172-74, 205-
10, 233-38.
8. See id. at 56, 102-05.
9. See id. at 86-88.
10. See id. at 91.
11. See id. at 89.
12. See id. at 112-18, 141-55. Interestingly, table 4.2 on page 115 of The Post-Cold
War Trading System reveals thatJapan's share of the total U.S. trade deficit did not much
rise much during the 1980s (starting at 33.7% in 1980, peaking at 45.6% in 1981, de-
clining to 29.8% in 1984, and finishing decade at 35.9%), i.e., it grew only in absolute
terms, not relative to the shares of Germany, France, Italy, or the United Kingdom.
Thus, perhaps some of the increased system friction attributable to the bilateral trade
deficit was unfounded.
Indeed, as the book also reveals, an important reason for the persistent U.S. trade
deficit with the Far East is the behavior of American multinational corporations
1998] 1651
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Thus, the United States insisted - over the strong opposi-
tion of the European Union and developing countries, princi-
pally India and Brazil - that the Uruguay Round agenda deal
directly with non-tariff barriers, as well as topics that mattered to
U.S. business, namely, services and intellectual property protec-
tion. 3 Eventually, the United States prevailed, and the success-
ful results of the Uruguay Round - particularly in the Agree-
ments on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Safeguards,
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"),
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") -
are widely known.14
In addition, as The Post-Cold War Trading System points out,
during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, the
United States developed five different initiatives to piy open the
Japanese market through changes in the way Japan, Inc. did
business.' 5 First, the 1985-87 Market Opening Sector Specific
("MOSS") talks were aimed at increasing transparency in Japa-
nese government procurement and product standard setting
and testing (particularly with respect to high-technology prod-
ucts like medical, pharmaceutical, and telecommunications
equipment). Second, voluntary export restraints ("VERs") were
used to respond to growing imports of Japanese cars into the
United States during the early and mid 1980s and, indirectly, to
("MNCs"). They tend to regard the Far East as a low-wage platform for manufacturing
low-value added products and exporting the finished items to the United States. This
behavior, along with the operation of Asian companies exporting to the United States,
and the tendency of Asian companies to import capital goods from Japan rather than
the United States, exacerbates the trade deficit. See id. at 144-45, 161-67, 172-74.
Unfortunately, The Post-Cold War Trading System does not critically address the con-
cept of a bilateral trade deficit in an era of MNCs and global production. The concept
may have some meaning in the world of Smith and Ricardo where all exporters are
firms located and producing in an exporting country. But, where the exporters are
MNCs for which political boundaries are largely unimportant, does a bilateral deficit
matter? Indeed, if many of the MNCs are headquartered in the United States, and have
large numbers of U.S. shareholders who benefit from stock appreciation and higher
dividends when their companies' export revenues increase, then might a deficit be a
positive phenomenon?
13. See id. at 105-08, 175-77.
14. For in-depth treatments of these results, see RAj BHAuA & KEVIN KENNEDY,
WORLD TRADE LAV (1998); RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS (1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw]. The Post-Cold War Trading System
provides a brief overview of the Safeguards, Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMs"), TRIPs, and GATS Agreements, as well as the antidumping rules and the
creation of the WTO. See OsTRY, supra note 2, at 178-200.
15. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 122-32.
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the competitive threat posed by the production keiretsu (i.e., the
long-term reciprocal contractual relations between suppliers and
assemblers). Third, the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement intro-
duced specific market share targets for foreign semiconductor
chip producers in an effort to combat the vertically integrated
structure and oligopolistic nature of the Japanese electronics in-
dustry, and also aimed to eliminate dumping of chips by Japa-
nese firms. The Agreement was reincarnated in 1991,16 and
again in 1996 without any promises about foreign market
share.17 Fourth, the 1989-90 Structural Impediments Initiative
("SII"), which was renewed briefly in 1992, sought to reduce a
broad array of undefined "structural" impediments in Japan to
imports, exemplified by a vertical distribution keiretsu (i.e., long-
term exclusive buying and dealing arrangements), lax antitrust
enforcement, discriminatory pricing policies, and restrictive
land-use practices. Finally, the U.S.-Japan Framework for a New
Economic Partnership, launched in July 1993 was a combination
of the MOSS, SII, and results-oriented benchmarks for measur-
ing import penetration in Japan, particularly with respect to au-
tos, auto parts, high-technology products, and insurance and
other financial services. By the end of 1995, the Framework talks
led to twenty bilateral agreements that included objective crite-
ria to monitor (but not guarantee) foreign market shares in Ja-
pan.
C. The End of the Cold War Bargain
Why was the United States so generous after World War II?
Why did it ignore the possibility it was creating not simply robust
trade partners, but also major trade rivals? Why did it not fore-
see the increase in system friction? Perhaps Americans were na-
ive. More likely, suggests The Post-Cold War Trading System, it was
Cold War realpolitik. As long as the Europeans and Japanese sup-
ported, by means of military alliances and political machina-
tions, our doctrine of containing the spread of Soviet and Chi-
nese communism, presidents and their State Departments did
16. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw, supra note 14, at 1141-44.
17. See Helene Cooper, U.S. and Japan Reach a Vague Accord on Chips that is Largely
Unenforceable, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1996, at A2; Nancy Dunne & Michiyo Nakamoto,
Microchip Pact Agreed by Tokyo and Washington, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3-4, 1996, at 1.
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not care much about "low" foreign policy agenda items like
trade.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, coupled with the convergence of
the U.S., European, and Japanese economic performance and
the new protectionism that had developed during the 1970s,
spelled the end of this Cold War bargain between the United
States and its trading partner-rivals.18 The United States devel-
oped a multi-track trade policy, and expanded the scope of trade
negotiations. It simultaneously pursued multilateral, regional,
and unilateral methods to achieve trade liberalization. It sig-
naled an abandonment of a whole-hearted commitment to the
multilateral spirit of the GATT-WTO system of which the United
States was the architect, and in particular, of the vision of Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, that
multilateral trade liberalization based on reciprocal concessions
would lead to economic prosperity, which in turn would rein-
force world peace. 9
In other words, the United State's methods became less pre-
dictable. Our trading partner-rivals no longer could be quite
sure how the United States might go about the business of trade
liberalization. Moreover, as suggested above, 20 the United States
began applying these methods to an agenda that went far be-
yond tariff and non-tariff barriers, embracing intellectual prop-
erty, services, foreign direct investment ("FDI"), competition
policy, and labor and environmental standards. Negotiations on
such items is inherently complex because defining what consti-
tutes "reciprocal" concessions is fraught with difficulty. It is one
thing to agree upon a ten percent cut in tariffs or an expansion
by 100,000 units of a quota; it is quite another matter to discern
whether barriers to entry against foreign retail stores, or public
procurement, in the U.S. market are on par with barriers in Ja-
21pan. In sum, with the end of the Cold War, both the means
18. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 70-71, 76-86, 237-38.
19. See id. at 58, 67-72, 85-86, 91-95, 97-98.
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. Each of these examples has been on the U.S. negotiating agenda with Japan.
Recently, Prime Minister Hashimoto's ruling Liberal Democratic Party announced it
would repeal Japan's Large-Scale Retail Store Law, pursuant to which the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry ("MITI") strictly regulated the entry of large stores
into municipalities by, inter alia, setting rules on floor space and closing times. The
repeal of the Law is expected to ease foreign store entry, because municipalities seek to
encourage big stores, including foreign chains, into their areas. With the repeal, mu-
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and ends of trade negotiations became highly contentious and
convoluted.
The successes of the Uruguay Round do not alter this cen-
tral fact. Indeed, The Post-Cold War Trading System indicates that
the experience of the Uruguay Round is a harbinger of still
more system friction to come. The unfinished agenda includes
better protections for FDI that are found in the Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures, labor issues (the United
States was not able to persuade the WTO to place trade and la-
bor issues on the agenda at the December 1996 Ministerial meet-
ing in Singapore), and possibly environmental matters.22 Like-
wise, the United States's five trade initiatives with Japan are harb-
ingers of future system friction. Bilateral trade deficits with
Japan persist; indeed, given the strong dollar in the wake of the
1997-98 Asian currency crisis, these deficits are certain to in-
crease. U.S. businesses in, key sectors, including autos, still com-
plain of market access difficulties. Most importantly, as The Post-
Cold War Trading System ably presents, the "domain of trade pol-
icy has extended inside the border,"23 which means the per-
ceived threat to sovereignty among the enemies of trade liberali-
zation is greater than ever before.
The book's solution, to use the Uruguay Round Understand-
ing on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("DSU') ,24 along with the nullification and impairment clause of
GATT Article XXIII: 1 (b)25 as a way of bringing about incremen-
tal adaptation and change, is a constructive one.26 However,
nicipalities will be free (subject to environmental guidelines issued by MITI) to approve
or reject entry of stores with floor space exceeding 1,000 square meters. See Toshio
Aritake, Japan Planning Retail Guidelines Along with Revised Retail Store Law, 15 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 5 (Jan. 7, 1998). Regarding public procurement, the Japanese Min-
istry of Construction is considering measures to improve the transparency of public
works projects. For example, the Ministry may disclose publicly projected contract
prices, after the tendering period. (Disclosure before the bidding process could lead to
bid-rigging.) It also may empower contract-awarding entities to examine bidders to
ensure under-qualified construction firms do not participate in tenders. See Japan Con-
struction Panel Plans to Propose Improved Transparency in Public Works Bids, 15 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 7, 1998).
22. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 183-92, 216-31.
23. See id. at 205.
24. The DSU is reprinted in a variety of sources, including RAj BHt.A&, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS - DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 397-425 (1996).
25. The GATT is reprinted in a variety of sources, including DOCUMENTS SUPPLE-
MENT, supra note 24, at 1-67. Article XXIII appears at page 46.
26. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 207-10. Indeed, this reviewer has advocated the
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such change is by definition slow. More seriously, it implies a
theoretical view of the GATT-WTO system as a dynamic, growing
organism, not a static set of rules, and presumes a willingness
among WTO Members to allow WTO panels and the Appellate
Body to be judicial activists. Such activism creates deep philo-
sophical and political schisms in a domestic legal context. Given
the sovereignty howls of protectionists, and even of some more
enlightened observers, surely it would be no less controversial in
the international context. Possible controversy, however, is not a
reason to be dissuaded from trying the book's useful proposal.
II. IS The Post-Cold War Trading System DESULTORY?
A. The Need for a Thesis
The Post-Cold War Trading System seems to lack a definite plan
or purpose other than to describe. There is no central thesis
advanced that neatly and cogently ties together the many topics
covered. From time to time, there are glimpses of a unifying
argument, such as (1) the rise and fall of Hull's vision of a link
between free trade, economic prosperity, and global peace, (2)
the essential compromise embedded in the 1947 GATT docu-
ment, namely, the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers in ex-
change for escapes from negotiated trade-liberalizing commit-
ments in order to meet domestic policy objectives, and (3) the
subservience of U.S. trade policy to nationalsecurity policy dur-
ing the Cold War.27 Even some of these glimpses are a bit fuzzy.
For example, the claim that the essential compromise of GATT
reflected not Hull's vision, but rather "masked significant differ-
ences" among the United States, Europe, and Japan on the role
of government, viz, "the nature and extent of government interven-
tion to achieve domestic objectives,"28 is made with hindsight oblivi-
ous to the relevant chronology. If these differences were not
striking until at least the 1950s, and possibly well thereafter, how
could they have been the basis for a document hammered out in
1946 and 1947?
Thus, The Post-Cold War Trading System is largely exposi-
tional, reading more like a history of the modern era of interna-
same solution. See Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading
System, 15 BERIELEYJ. INT'L L. issue 2 (1998) [hereinafter Hegelian Reflections].
27. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 58-72.
28. Id. at 72 (emphasis original).
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tional trade law and policy than a unique, provocative perspec-
tive on this history. However, expositions deserve an important
place in, and add value to, international trade scholarship, par-
ticularly when they ably synthesize as much material and present
it as clearly as does The Post-Cold War Trading System. The point is
that the book is sure to inform the reader, but not necessarily
fundamentally change the way the reader thinks about issues in
international trade law and policy. To be fair, of course, how
many scholars (including this reviewer) can justifiably claim to
have authored the great paradigm-shifting piece? In this regard,
the assertion in the Preface that " [i] t is not difficult to outline a
grand vision of the global trading system of the twenty-first cen-
tury" is naive.29 At least three theses could have been developed
in The Post-Cold War Trading System that would have flowed natu-
rally from the existing exposition and suggested a grand vision.
1. There is No Such Thing As Free Trade At Law
First, an important possible thesis The Post-Cold War Trading
System might have developed concerns the essential compromise
of GATT, or more generally the practical irrelevance of free
trade theory. As a matter of law, it can be argued that there is no
such thing as free trade. Free trade exists only in the minds and
on the graphs of neoclassical economists. If the economic law of
comparative advantage were translated fully and faithfully by
trade negotiators into "real" law, then surely trade-liberalizing
deals like the Uruguay Round agreements or the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") need only be one page.
Article I of the deal would state that "all tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers are hereby abolished." Article II would define broadly, with
no exceptions, the terms "tariff barrier" and "non-tariff barrier."
Thereafter would follow the signatures of the parties. It is the
myriad exceptions to trade-liberalizing provisions, and the con-
cern with "fair" trade and remedies to "unfair" trade practices,
that help explain why so-called free trade agreements are so long
and complex. Put slightly differently, it can be argued that as a
matter of law, all trade is managed trade, because a careful read
of any trade agreement reveals more than mere remnants of
trade barriers. It reveals, inter alia, express carve-outs for certain
preferred sectors, intricate and protective rules of origin,
29. Id. at xviii.
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lengthy phase-in periods for trade-liberalizing obligations, and
lengthy phase-out periods for trade barriers. The discussion in
The Post-Cold War Trading System of the five Reagan-Bush-Clinton
Administration initiatives regarding Japan, particularly those ini-
tiatives establishing foreign market share goals or seeking at least
to monitor foreign market share, illustrate this argument. Yet,
the book does not make this point, much less highlight the free
trade-managed trade distinction implicit in these initiatives.
2. Developing Countries
A second thesis The Post-Cold War Trading System might have
advanced concerns developing countries. Except for a chapter
on the growth of East Asia,3 ° less developed countries ("LDCs")
are not given extensive treatment. Yet, it could be argued that
the most significant fissure in the world trading system is be-
tween LDCs and developed countries ("DCs"). If Hamish Mc-
Rae's prognostication in The World in 2020 is accepted, then by
2020 there will be three dominant economic regions: North
America, western Europe, and the Far East.31 Few countries in
Latin America, central and eastern Europe, South Asia, and Af-
rica will have achieved sustained economic growth rates by 2020
so as to propel themselves into the ranks of DCs.
Consequently, they may demand wealth redistribution from
the DCs, and their demands may in some instances be backed by
terrorism. The world in 2020, then, may be a more dangerous
place than it is now. The Post-Cold War Trading System might have
identified the special and differential treatment accorded by the
Uruguay Round agreements to LDCs, which principally takes the
form of longer phase-in periods during which to meet certain
obligations, and relief from other obligations. The book might
have characterized this treatment - rightly - as paltry, and
thereby concluded that the Uruguay Round was a watershed in
DC-LDC relations. History may record that in this Round, the
radical demands made by some LDCs since the 1960s for a "new
international economic order" in which the world trading system
would be restructured to allow for wealth redistribution from
DCs to LDCs were finally defeated. Put crudely (and perhaps
too simply), all the LDCs got was a little more time to live up to
30. See id. at ch. 5.
31. See HAMISH McRAE, THE WORLD IN 2020 pts. I, lII (1994).
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the agreements, and they were forced to make agreements on
matters of greatest importance to DCs, namely, services and in-
tellectual property.
Had The Post-Cold War Trading System made this observation,
the book could have then proceeded along one of two lines of
argument. A conservative argument could have been fashioned
based on the economic development views of Lord Bauer,
namely, that LDCs have largely themselves to blame for much of
their plight (e.g., for reasons of corruption and mismanage-
ment),32 and that most mainstream economic thought about de-
velopment problems is erroneous. 3 There is, for example, no
such thing as a vicious cycle of poverty (i.e., the notion that an
LDC cannot escape poverty because incomes are too low to accu-
mulate savings, which in turn are needed for investment in pro-
ductive assets that raise incomes). After all, Bauer observes,
"[t]o have money is the result of economic achievement, not its
precondition."34 Millions of poor Third World farmers have
made sizeable investments in agriculture and moved from subsis-
tence to cash crop farming. Thereafter, low-value added manu-
facturing sectors have evolved. This happy growth process also
occurred in what is now the developed world. Most importantly,
the process does not, and need not, involve external donations,
such as radical wealth redistribution through a restructuring of
the trading system. Thus, The Post-Cold War Trading System could
have argued that the Uruguay Round watershed is to be cele-
brated, because it represents the triumph of Bauer-type thinking
about development problems over radical left demands.
A second and ideologically antipodal argument that the
book might have advanced is that the Uruguay Round watershed
is to be bemoaned, because it signals the widening and deepen-
ing gap between DCs and LDCs. The lack of meaningful special
and differential treatment shows LDCs are powerless in multilat-
eral trade negotiations, and underscores that the WTO is not a
development agency. To the contrary, it is a system of rules writ-
32. See PETER T. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD AND ECONOMIC DELUSION 66-
85 (1981).
33. See PETER T. BAUER, DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT chs. 2-3, 8 (1976) [hereinafter
DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT].
34. PETER T. BAUER, SUBSISTENCE, TRADE, AND EXCHANGE: UNDERSTANDING DEVEL-
OPING ECONOMIES 7 (Cato Institute Distinguished Lecture Series, Oct. 14, 1992). See
also DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT, supra note 33, at 31-38.
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ten to ensure market access for products from DCs.3 5 This sec-
ond argument could insist the system become more responsive
to LDC needs, and suggest a commitment to a particular concep-
tion of justice as a vehicle for greater responsiveness. One possi-
ble applicable theory of justice could be distributive justice the-
ory. 6 In very general and no doubt overly-simplistic terms, dis-
tributive justice theory begins by positing that "[e] ach person
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the wel-
fare of society as a whole cannot override."" v If the polity is re-
conceived not as individuals in a society, but as countries in a
global economy, then it might be re-posited that each country
possesses an inviolability that cannot be compromised even for a
broader utilitarian good. That inviolability, it could be argued,
consists of the right to compete on an equal basis in the global
market, and the right to receive assistance designed to ensure
equality of competitive opportunity in a broad sense. The assist-
ance ought to include better special and differential treatment
than now exists in the Uruguay Round agreements. This non-
utilitarian, distributive justice-based logic could be reinforced by
a utilitarian point. As long as LDCs cannot compete effectively
and are not integrated into the world trading system, global
peace and security is at risk. Poor countries with little stake in
the system are, after all, susceptible to leaders and movements
seeking to disrupt the system. 318 In sum, The Post-Cold War Trad-
ing System might have bemoaned the shabby treatment of LDCs
in the Uruguay Round, and argued from distributive justice the-
ory, utilitarian theory, or both for a new trade order.
35. A somewhat less pessimistic or cynical variant of this argument is that the spe-
cial and differential treatment accorded in .the Uruguay Round is the best compromise
LDCs could expect between their demands for a new order and resistance by DCs to
those demands. If LDCs take advantage of the favors they did get, then perhaps they
can better integrate into the world trading system and develop into meaningful trading
partners with diversified economies.
36. See, e.g.,JoHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996); CHANDRAN
KUKATHAS & PHILIP PETrIT, RAWLS - A THEORY OFJUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS (1990); NOR-
MAN DANIELS, ED., READING RAWLS - CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAwLs' A THEORY OFJUSTICE;
THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989);JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
For an excellent and clear overview of distributive justice theory, see ALAN BROWN, MOD-
ERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY ch. 3 (1986).
37. RAWLS, supra note 36, at 3.
38. As Lester Thurow writes, "[t]he losers, those who are left out and cannot make
the system work, retreat into religious fundamentalism, where a world of certainty re-
places a world of uncertainty." LESTER C. THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 18
(1996).
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3. Persistent Doubts About Free Trade
Why are free trade theory and empirical evidence on the
benefits of trade liberalization not universally persuasive? This
issue is not addressed directly in The Post-Cold War Trading System,
but it is a paradox in international trade law and policy, and it is
a third possible basis for the development of a thesis in the book.
The compelling nature of Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's
static demonstration of comparative advantage, as well as more
recent dynamic models of international trade, cannot be
doubted, Doubters like India and Argentina that pursued pro-
tectionist, import-substitution policies for most of the post-World
War II period are reversing course. The resolution to the para-
dox may lie in the treatment of losers from trade liberalization.
As Ravi Batra argues forcefully in The Myth of Free Trade, there are
workers in certain sectors of the United States whose real wages
orjobs are threatened (though as Lester Thurow counters in The
Future of Capitalism, the threat may come from an inability to de-
velop prized skills and adapt to new technologies)." These
workers are certain to oppose trade liberalization, and if the sec-
tors they represent are politically dominant in their countries,
official policy may be geared against market-opening ventures
with other countries. Thus, until international trade law and
policy treats the losers better, the paradox is sure to persist.
In terms of economic theory, the way to express this point is
that U.S. trade policy has yet to deal with the consequences of
the Stopler-Samuelson theorem. This theorem states that
"[flree international trade benefits the abundant factor and
harms the scarce factor."4 The intuitive argument behind this
theorem requires reference to two closely related theorems, the
factor price equalization and Heckscher-Ohlin theorems.4' As-
sume (as is true) that relative to China, the United States is a
capital-abundant and labor-scarce country. Before trade occurs
between the two countries, each country produces the capital-
and labor-intensive product and consumes each product itself.
When trade begins between the two countries, the Stopler-Samu-
39. See RAVI BATRA, THE MYri OF FREE TRADE 35-53 (1993); THUROW, supra note
38, at 166-84 (1996).
40. STEVEN HUSTED & MICHAEL MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 111 (1998).
41. The discussion of the Stopler-Samuelson, factor price equalization, and Heck-
scher-Ohlin theorems is drawn from HUSTED & MELVIN, supra note 40, at 100-02, 108-
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elson theorem predicts returns to capital in the United States
(rents) will rise, and the returns to labor (wages) will fall. The
converse phenomenon will occur in China. These two out-
comes, taken together, represent factor price equalization. The
factor price equalization theorem holds that international trade
will lead to the international equalization of individual factor
prices, assuming there are no trade barriers and factors have
equal access to identical technology. Accordingly, capital rents
rise in the United States and fall in China to a rough parity, and
wage rates fall in the United States and rise in China to a rough
parity.
Capital rents rise, and wage rates fall, in the United States
because, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, with inter-
national trade the United States specializes in the production of
the factor with which it is relatively well endowed, namely capi-
tal. That is, the United States exports a capital-intensive product
to China, and China exports a labor-intensive product to the
United States. Consequently, production of the labor-intensive
good in the United States diminishes, and labor is idled, as the
Chinese labor-intensive product enters the U.S. market. (Again,
the converse phenomenon occurs in China.) American workers
no longer can exploit their relative scarcity and command high
wage rates. In contrast production of the capital-intensive good
in the United States rises to meet export demand. Correspond-
ingly the demand for capital increases, and thus so too does the
return to capital. Yet, the demand for capital cannot, be met en-
tirely by the transfer of capital from the contracting labor-inten-
sive industry. Precisely because the contracting industry is labor-
intensive, its capital stock is not sufficiently large to meet the
demand. Thus, the Stopler-Samuelson theorem: the abundant
factor in the United States, capital, benefits from trade liberaliza-
tion (i.e., rents rise), while the scarce factor, labor, loses (i.e.,
wages fall).
The Post-Cold War Trading System provides a glimpse, in an
almost off-handed way, of why many American workers, particu-
larly those in unions, are opposed to trade liberalization. Rely-
ing on a distinction made by Alfred 0. Hirschman in Exit, Voice
and Loyalty between "Exit" and "Voice, '"42 the book suggests cor-
42. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 83, 235; ALFRED 0. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND
LOYALTY (1971). For an application of this distinction, see Alexis Jacquemin & David
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rectly that the United States pursues a strategy of "Exit" with re-
spect to displaced workers, whereas the European Union follows
a course of "Voice" with respect to such workers. In an Exit para-
digm, losers are expected to disappear without receiving much,
if any, compensation for their loss. This paradigm rewards the
most efficient, and relies on decentralized, anonymous market
mechanisms to allocate the adjustment costs associated with
freer trade. Specifically, workers' fortunes rise and fall based on
the interaction of their human capital endowments and im-
provements thereto with local, regional, national, and global
trends in their industries. Workers cannot rely on government
help when their fortunes decline. The U.S. trade adjustment
assistance programs have been ravaged by budget cuts in an era
of budget-balancing efforts,43 and relief under the escape clause
(Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended 44 ) is unlikely
owing to difficulties of proving increased imports are the "sub-
stantial cause" of "serious" injury. Likewise, workers in some de-
veloping countries reliant on one or a small number of com-
modity exports for earnings fear stiff import competition result-
ing from trade liberalization because such competition would
make the birth of new industries, and the growth of infant indus-
tries, difficult.
In contrast, a Voice paradigm is less fluid and dynamic than
an Exit paradigm. Workers are not viewed as substitutable or
disposable. The government plays an active role in managing
the social. costs of adjustment imposed on certain groups of
workers. There is a rigid framework in which negotiations be-
tween the public and private sectors take place. The result is less
emphasis on economic efficiency, but more emphasis on socio-
political cohesion, than in a Voice paradigm.. Many European
governments - most notably the French - play precisely this
expanded, activistic role. Workers in a Voice paradigm may op-
pose trade liberalization if they fear it will lead to a loss of Voice,
for example, a cut in adjustment assistance.
The Exit-Voice distinction suggests potentially displaced
workers in developed countries, and many developing countries,
Wright, Corporate Strategies and European Challenges Post-1992, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
535, 536 (1993).
43. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105'" CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPILA-
TION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 106-15 (Comm. Print 1997).
44. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254.
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will not accept the otherwise forceful logic of Smith and Ricardo
unless and until they are given a reasonably loud and lasting
Voice. Movements to restrict imports from countries that do not
enforce internationally recognized workers rights also can be
viewed according to this distinction. Developed country labor
advocates of such restrictions surely are motivated in part by fear
of wage erosion orjob loss, as well as bona fide humanitarian sen-
timents. Developing country labor activists advocating stronger
enforcement mechanisms are motivated by concerns about ex-
ploitation. Both groups seek a greater Voice in international
trade law and policy.
What Voice might persuade potentially displaced workers?
Put in economic terms, how might the United States deal with
the Stopler-Samuelson theorem? The Post-Cold War Trading Sys-
tem might have oriented its discussion of the Uruguay Round
reforms of safeguard remedies to this issue. One answer is to
consider whether use of the GATT Article XIX escape clause
pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards likely
to benefit the losers?45 On the one hand, the Agreement bars
voluntary restraint agreements ("VRAs") as a solution to import
surges, largely because VRAs are not transparent.46 Govern-
ments seeking to invoke Article XIX must, therefore, adopt a
"real" remedy like a tariff or quota. Furthermore, retaliation
against such a remedy must be deferred for the first three years
in which a remedy is in effect.4 7 On the other hand, the remedy
is limited in duration to four years,48 with a maximum extension
of four more years,49 though the periods for developing and
least developed countries are more generous.5" Another feature
of the Voice might be a more generous system of preferential
trading arrangements (e.g., the Generalized System of Prefer-
45. This Article and Agreement are reprinted in a variety of sources, including
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 4243, 314-24, respectively.
46. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 11:1 (b), 2, reprinted in Doc-
UMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 320-21.
47. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 8:2-3, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 319.
48. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 7:1, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 318.
49. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 7:2-3, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 318.
50. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 9:2, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 320.
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ences and the Lome Convention), with fewer political criteria
that must be met to benefit from, these arrangements, to help
spawn and nurture industries in developing countries. Still an-
other possibility would be the establishment, under the auspices
of the WTO (perhaps in coordination with the World Bank) of a
global fund for trade adjustment assistance that would sponsor
worker retraining and relocation programs through grants and
loans. In sum, The Post-Cold War Trading System might have ar-
gued that until the consequences of trade liberalization for the
losers are dealt with in one (or more) of the aforementioned, or
some alternative, method the winners will face vocal and aggres-
sive opposition to freer trade.
B. American Trade History
In addition to the need for an overarching thesis, The Post-
Cold War Trading System requires more careful treatment of the
history of American international trade law and policy. The
book's contention that the United States had a "single, overrid-
ing commitment to multilateralism," which it "abandoned" in
1986 when the Uruguay Round was launched, is dubious." In-
deed, the analysis in The Post-Cold War Trading System of the fail-
ure of the Havana Charter in 1950, and the United States's grow-
ing resentment in the 1970s of unfair trading practices, contra-
dicts the contention of a whole-hearted commitment to
multilateralism.52 The United States never had such a commit-
ment, and perhaps never will. Rather, it has shifted its relative
emphases among multilateralism, regionalism, and unilateralism
at different times in its history depending on political and eco-
nomic forces.53
More generally, trade policy is a subset, even an instrument,
of foreign policy. Ever since President George Washington de-
clared in his Farewell Address that "[t] he great rule of conduct
for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commer-
cial relations to have with them as little Political connection as
51. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 97.
52. See id. at 63, 70.
53. See generally STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE
POLICY (1996) (discussing three critical features of U.S. foreign trade policy formula-
tion and implementation, namely, economics, politics, and law); ALFRED EcKs, OPEN-
ING AMERICA'S MARKET (1995) (discussing history of U.S. international trade law and
policy since 1776).
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possible,"54 isolationism has been an impulse in U.S. foreign
policy.55 Thus, it should come as no surprise that the unilateral-
ist bravado of presidential hopefuls like Patrick Buchanan and
Richard Gephardt appeals to roughly one-quarter, and some-
times in some states one-third, of voters in presidential prima-
ries." Likewise, ever since the declaration of the Monroe Doc-
trine,5 7 regionalism, in the form of a particular focus on North
and South America, has been an element of foreign policy. In
sum, The Post-Cold War Trading System mistakenly bemoans a past
that never was. It would have done better to suggest ways the
United States's emphasis on multilateralism could be strength-
ened in the new millennium.
C. U.S. Multi-Track,Trade Policy
Related to the need for a more careful treatment of U.S.
history is the failure of The Post-Cold War Trading System to make a
convincing case against a multi-track trade policy. Only a half-
hearted argument is made against regionalism," though many
can be made (e.g., it undermines the GATT-WTO system by di-
viding the world into trading blocs, and in practice customs un-
ions and free trade agreements cause trade diversion and are not
stepping stones to broader liberalization). To the contrary, it is
acknowledged that regionalism (in contrast to unilateralism) "is
compatible with" a rules-based global trading system,59 and some
of the advantages of realism are highlighted. For example,
deeper integration may be easier to achieve in a regional rather
than multilateral forum because the latter is larger and, there-
54. Quoted in ROBERT W. TUCKER & DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 239-
240 (1990) (emphasis original).
55. See, e.g., WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
108-61 (1972) (discussing isolationism and Open Door Policy during 1920s); II ALEX-
ANDER DECONDE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 128-49 (3rd ed. 1978) (discuss-
ing economic nationalism and isolationism between World War I and World War II).
56. See generally THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RE-
TALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994) (discussing use of Section 301 of Trade Act of
1974, as amended).
57. See, e.g., DANIEL COIT GILMAN, JAMES MONROE 159-79 (Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr. ed., Chelsea House Publishers 1983 ed.) (1898) (discussing Monroe Doctrine and
United States's long-standing interest in Latin America); I ALEXANDER DECONDE, A HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 109-33 (3rd ed. 1978) (discussing Monroe Doctrine).
58. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 203-04.
59. See id. at 237.
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fore, unwieldy.6" While procedural checks against the tyranny of
the majority exist in the Uruguay Round agreements, such as the
consensus rule in the DSU concerning the creation of panels,
adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, and authoriza-
tion of retaliation,61 the economically dominant powers like the
United States, European Union, and Japan may be vulnerable in
other respects (e.g., placing items on a negotiating agenda).
However, the book's proposal that all regional arrangements ap-
ply the MFN principle, perhaps with some delay, to non-arrange-
ment members as a way of ensuring a convergence of regional-
ism and multilateralism is interesting and worthy of more discus-
62sion.
The book makes two arguments against unilateralism. First,
as mentioned above, unilateralism may lead to less predictability
in U.S. trade policy." But, why is that bad from a U.S. view-
point? Ambiguity and uncertainty may have a tactical, even stra-
tegic value. Candidly, putting actual or potential rivals slightly
off balance about U.S. actions and responses may keep them in
check if they assume the highest probability U.S. action or re-
sponse would be the one most seriously adverse to their inter-
ests. One of President Nixon's ten commandments of statecraft
is "never let your adversary underestimate what you would do in
response to a challenge," and correspondingly "never tell him
what you would not do."6 4  (President Nixon relied on this strat-
egy, arguably with some success, during the Vietnam War to per-
suade the then-North Vietnamese government to participate in
the Paris peace talks.65 In a more recent context, strategic ambi-
guity is probably one factor keeping the People's Liberation
Army from forcibly repatriating Taiwan.) Of course, the adversa-
ries might also miscalculate and commit a costly blunder. (Obvi-
60. See id. at 195.
61. See id. at 196; DSU, Arts. 2:4 n.1 (definition of "consensus" as no formal objec-
tion from any WTO Member), 6:1 (establishment of panel unless consensus not to es-
tablish panel), 16:4 (adoption of panel report unless consensus not to adopt report),
17:14 (adoption of Appellate Body report unless consensus not to adopt the report),
and 22:6 (authorization to approve request to take retaliatory action unless consensus
to reject request), reprinted in Documents Supplement, supra note 24, at 397-420.
62. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 204. The book's other proposal, that all regional
arrangements be tabled in the WTO for monitoring, does not sound all that different
from the requirements of Article XXIV of GATT.
63. See id. at 123.
64. JAMES C. HUMES, NIXON'S TEN COMMANDMENTS OF STATECRAFT 105 (1997).
65. See id. at 106-13.
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ously, there are game theory implications of strategic ambiguity
to be explored.)
Second, The Post-Cold War Trading System urges that unilat-
eral trade actions are "the wrong thing for the right reasons. "66
The argument is tricky, but it seems to be that the United States
violates the GATT-WTO rules in order to defend them, which in
turn suggests that the United States has a higher degree, even
unique endowment of, sovereign power in that system. This ar-
gument seems to misread the procedural requirements of Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.67 If a dispute
"involves" an international trade agreement and a mutually
agreeable solution is not reached through direct consultations
within a prescribed period, then the United States is obligated
by statute to follow any dispute settlement mechanisms set forth
in that agreement. 6 To be sure, there is a degree of unilateral-
ism in initial decision as to whether a dispute involves an interna-
tional trade agreement. But, at least in matters unequivocally
not covered by an agreement, where is the GATT-WTO violation
in invoking Section 301? The answer may be that a Section 301
remedy may involve denial of MFN or national treatment, or the
imposition of quantitative restrictions, hence it is the remedial
action that is offensive. However, is not a rebuttal to this answer
that if the initial dispute is not covered by the GATT-WTO rules,
then neither ought any remedy to be covered?
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
SCHOLARSHIP: A CALL FOR MORE THEORY
The comments about The Post-Cold War Trading System made
in Part II suggest a need for the application of greater theory to
practical problems in international trade scholarship.69 After all,
a thesis about international trade law ought to be advanced on
the basis of some theory, which may be a distinction between
66. See OSTRY, supra note 2, at 122.
67. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 et seq.
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (2).
69. In this respect, there are some promising explorations being made. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE (1996); RicHARD F. TEICHGRAEBER, III, "FREE
TRADE" AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1986); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and": Recent Devel-
opments in Trade Policy and Scholarship - And Their Surprising Political Implications,
17 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 759 (1996-97). For an example of this reviewer's efforts, see
Hegelian Reflections, supra note 26.
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free and managed trade, or a vision of justice in the global econ-
omy. The Post-Cold War Trading System not only is majestic in its
coverage of the modern era of international trade law, but also is
a catalyst for thought about what theories might be developed or
invoked to address pressing issues. It is, in these respects, a
highly recommended piece of scholarship.
GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE
BOUNDS OF POWER
Reviewed by Barry E. Hawk*
It is a difficult challenge to write a refreshing and insightful
book on antitrust policy after more than a century of U.S. debate
and almost half a century of European debate. Professor Giu-
liano Amato successfully has met that challenge in his highly en-
lightening opus on Antitrust and the Bounds of Power.1 Professor
Amato writes from the Olympian heights as the former head of
the well respected Italian Antitrust Authority, a former Prime
Minister of Italy, and the present professor at the European Uni-
versity Institute in Florence. As might be expected from an au-
thor with such broad public experience, Antitrust and the Bounds
of Power places antitrust law in the broader context of political
theory and history. Although the author modestly states that the
book is written for young people embarking on an immersion in
antitrust law, seasoned antitrust veterans will greatly benefit from
Professor Amato's measured wisdom.
Professor Amato begins with the judgment that the desira-
ble introduction of increasingly sophisticated economic analysis
into antitrust law has obscured some of the problems and policy
goals that antitrust law was born to deal with. He persuasively
places the genesis of antitrust both in the United States and in
Europe in politics, notably the political values underlying liberal
democracy. According to Professor Amato, liberal democracy
faces the following dilemma: the fundamental freedom of indi-
viduals to trade can lead to the opposite phenomenon of private
power that is capable of infringing not just the economic free-
dom of other individuals but also the balance of public deci-
sions. In a democratic society two boundaries should never be
crossed: one beyond which the unlegitimated power of individu-
als arises, the other beyond which legitimate public power be-
comes illegitimate. Antitrust law is relevant to understanding
both sides of the divide and to deciding where the boundaries
should be set. Professor's Amato's book is devoted to this gen-
* Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York; Director, Fordham Corporate
Law Institute.
1. GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER (1997).
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eral theme and his explication of antitrust law is set against the
background of this political dilemma in a liberal democracy.
Chapter One sets forth a brief but perceptive analysis of the
early history of the Sherman Act case law. Several interesting
observations are made. For example, Professor Amato reads the
early decisions as points on a continuous line seeking to define a
new boundary on market power, marked no longer by the alter-
native of freedom and coercion, but by respect for, or distortion
of, the economic rules laid down for the market itself by the
competitive system. He then draws the more general political
observation that the defenders of the old common law boundary
could see that the boundary had been shifted forward to allow
intrusions on freedom of contract that they perceived as op-
posed to the very foundations of liberal society.
Chapter Two deals with the more recent period in United
States antitrust enforcement, notably the influence of the so-
called Chicago School. Here, again, Professor's Amato's obser-
vations are nuanced and balanced. On the one hand, he ex-
presses doubts whether "consumer welfare" can be restricted to a
concept of lower prices and better product quality to the detri-
ment of diversity of consumer choice of more suppliers and
products.2 On the other hand, he praises the Chicago School
for having focused antitrust enforcement on market power and
efficiency.'
Chapter Three explores the history of European antitrust or
competition law. Its modern history begins with the German an-
titrust laws in the 1950s which had their inspiration in the so-
called Freiburg School or "Freiburger Ordoliberalen." The Frei-
burg School was concerned about non-legitimate private power
and the necessity to provide a solid institutional framework for
the competitive economy to prevent both formation of private
power and the creation with it, by linking up with public power,
of conglomerates that could engender tragedies such as oc-
curred during the Nazi period.4 The Freib'urg School's mistrust
of economic power because it can lead to political power is
echoed in the historical roots of U.S. antitrust law. The history
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. at 24.
4. Id. at 40-41; see also David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-
Liberalism, Comparative Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 25 (1994).
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of EC competition law is strikingly different, however, in its em-
phasis on market integration as a goal even to the subordination
of competition. This heavy emphasis on market integration and
the formalism adopted by many antitrust officials and practition-
ers has resulted in, on the one hand, formalisms and rigidities
and, on the other hand, permissive flexibilities that are pecu-
liarly European in origin. As Professor Amato demonstrates, the
EC's position towards vertical restraints is perhaps the best exam-
ple. Indeed, Professor Amato refers to the EC law on vertical
restraints as "European duplicity."
As Professor Amato points out, the market integration goal
is not the sole explanation for the differences in results between
U.S. antitrust law and European competition law. More funda-
mentally, there is a difference in "antitrust culture," i.e. the per-
sistence of a rooted European Culture of regulating and control-
ling the economy. Amato writes convincingly that EC competi-
tion policy rests on two ideas that are in tension: 1) the old idea
of supremacy of state power which is above the powers of private
individuals and is the most suitable instrument to confront pri-
vate power; and 2) the new idea of competition in the sense that
private power is simply a degeneration of freedom against which
the freedom of all must be guaranteed. In other words, in Eu-
rope there is still the tendency to prefer that government set the
boundary between economic power and freedom of enterprises
and not the constitutionally recognized solidity of specific free-
doms of each and all.5 ' In contrast, the United States is 'molie
accepting of private power, continuing to see it as a natural man-
ifestation or expression of private freedoms and thus preferred
to the interventions of public power.6
This European itch to regulate, or at least reluctance to let
markets self-correct, explains many differences between EC and
U.S. antitrust law and policy - for example, the EC resort to
block exemptions and the inclusion of non-competition policy
objectives in antitrust law, such as "industrial policy," or social
and regional policies.' Another important example concerns
abusive or monopolistic behavior by dominant firms where the
European itch to regulate also can be seen in the EC's broader
5. See AMATO, supra note 1, at 54.
6. Id. at 76-77.
7. Id. at 63-64.
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and stricter application of its antitrust laws to dominant firm be-
havior under Article 86 as compared with Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.8
The difference in scope between Article 86 and Section 2
rests on the European concern with protecting trading partners
that are "dependent" on dominant firms, even where this con-
cern conflicts with consumer welfare considerations. In other
words, there is a strong tendency under Article 86 (as well as
under the EEC Merger Regulation9 ) to protect competitors and
not simply competition.
This tendency to protect competitors, or at least to be un-
duly sensitive toward effect on competitors as opposed to effect
on consumers and consumer welfare, can also be seen in the
Commission's occasionally perverse treatment of efficiencies
under the EEC Merger Regulation. As Professor Amato points
out, the Commission in some cases appears to take the extreme
that greater efficiency is not a positive factor in reviewing merg-
ers but a negative one and thus has protected consumers not
because of market foreclosure and the associated restriction of
output but out of a concern for maintaining pluralism and de-
fending the right to sell to small producers currently on the mar-
ket.10
The recent evolution of EC competition law suggests, how-
ever, that there is a greater emphasis on protecting competition
and perhaps even the liberation of antitrust law from the multi-
ple purposes it has served in the past." Professor Amato
strongly approves of this change and notes that it may result in
the weakening of the old regulatory propensity. This would
mean rooting antitrust more in the encounter between free-
doms and economic rights at stake and less in the tradition of
balancing varying public interests; it also would mean making
economics the primary yardstick of antitrust analysis. 2 While
Professor Amato applauds this narrowing of antitrust policy, he
does not advocate an exclusive Chicago School-like reliance on
economic efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust. He reasons that
8. Id. at 68-69.
9. Council Regulation No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, O.J. L 257/14 (1990).
10. See AMATO, supra note 1, at 87.
11. Id. at 116.
12. Id. at 116-17.
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although much of European antitrust law has gone too far in
looking to industrial, social, and regional considerations in the
implementation of antitrust law, the other extreme would be a
Chicago School narrowing of antitrust solely to consumer wel-
fare defined as economic efficiency. Professor Amato rejects
both extremes and opts for the nuanced but more complex
middle ground where antitrust law takes into account not only
economic efficiency but also concerns about economic power
for political reasons.
After reviewing and comparing the history and present state
of U.S. and European antitrust law and policy, Professor Amato
returns to the broader political themes. He is particularly in-
structive in discussing how political history helps explain other
differences between U.S. and European law and policy. For ex-
ample, the Jeffersonian notion of a society of small citizen-farm-
ers that inspired the Sherman Act did not generate liberal de-
mocracy in Europe but rather the idea of a communist utopia.
This dramatically different outcome is explained by the Ameri-
can mistrust of the state compared with the traditional European
belief in the state. This difference in political attitudes toward
government is reflected in the fact that the word "state" is not a
common term in the U.S. political vocabulary, whereas the con-
cept of "l'etat" plays a strong role not only in European political
theory but also in popular European political debate. On the
other hand, the early European supporters of antitrust, like Jef-
ferson, also greatly mistrusted economic power but not only be-
cause it generated political power. They also mistrusted eco-
nomic power out of a concern that it reduced social solidarity.
Thus European antitrust law, both at the EC and the Member
State level, takes a stricter and more interventionist view toward
certain business practices and gives less weight to freedom of
contract and to freedom of firms to do business. In a sense, the
Europeans prefer "soft" competition to "hard" competition, as
those terms were used by Judge Learned Hand in his United
States v. Corn Products decision.13 It is perhaps inevitable that a
preference for soft over hard competition leads to an interven-
tionist antitrust policy which, in the European case, is rein-
forced by traditional statist preferences.
In sum, Antitrust And The Bounds of Power contributes to the
13. See United States v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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ongoing debate about antitrust policy goals by providing a
refreshingly broad and eminently wise political perspective. Nov-
ices, as well as the cognoscenti, will greatly benefit from a close
reading.

